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Abstract. Words change meaning over time. Some meaning shift is accompanied by a 
corresponding change in subject matter; some meaning shift is not. In this paper I 
argue that an account of linguistic meaning can accommodate the first kind of case, 
but that a theory of concepts is required to accommodate the second. Where there is 
stability of subject matter through linguistic change, it is concepts that provide the 
stability. The stability provided by concepts allows for genuine disagreement and 
ameliorative change in the context of conceptual engineering. 
 
I 
 
Introduction. The meaning of a word can, and typically does, change over time. I take 
meaning shift as a datum. Here are some examples. The term ‘meat’ used to mean 
food in general, and used to have a correspondingly broader extension than it has 
today; ‘a clue’ used to mean a ball of yarn, and hence had an entirely different 
extension from the one it does today; and the term ‘spinster’ used to mean a woman 
who spun wool, and thus had an extension that is distinct from but, perhaps, partially 
overlapping with the one it has today. There are historical, etymological connections 
between the old and the new meanings in each of these cases. I leave at an intuitive 
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level the question of the individuation of words and focus instead on providing an 
account of meaning shift.1  
 
From a philosophical perspective, meaning shift falls into two broad 
categories: cases that are accompanied by a corresponding change in subject matter; 
and cases that are not.2 The examples just given (‘meat’, ‘yarn’, and spinster’) are all 
of the former kind. In section II, I provide an account of linguistic meaning that 
accommodates such cases. The cases involve a single word w whose meaning m, 
extension e, and subject matter s at time t, are different from its meaning m’, 
extension e’ and subject matter s’ at a later time t’. The account of linguistic meaning 
I provide explains the difference between m and m’, the account of the relation 
between meaning and extension I provide explains the corresponding difference 
between e and e’. And, because the change in extension in these cases maps onto a 
change in subject matter over the relevant time period, there is no additional 
explanation required of the difference between s and s’. The account of linguistic 
meaning I provide is therefore fully explanatory of meaning shift in these cases.  
 
The second kind of case, which I discuss in section III, is not so 
straightforward. This is because, in the second kind of case, a shift in meaning is not 
accompanied by a change in subject matter even though, in a sense to be made clear, 
the extension of the term changes as a result of the meaning shift. It is this 
combination of difference in meaning and sameness of subject matter that provides 
the theoretical complication. Examples of meaning shift of this second kind include 
the change in meaning of terms such as ‘whale’ and ‘atom’, which are associated with 
distinct theories of the same subject matter at different times, and the ameliorative 
                                            
1 There is reason to think words cannot be individuated by appeal to syntactic features given that 
identity of shape is neither necessary nor sufficient for identity of words. The phenomenon of meaning-
shift casts doubt on the possibility of individuating words by their semantic features. For discussion of 
identity and persistence conditions of words see Kaplan (1990). See also Kaplan (2011), Hawthorne 
and LePore (2011) and Bromberger (2011). 
2 In this paper I deal with general terms only and leave indexical terms and singular uses of proper 
names to one side. 
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change in meaning of terms such as ‘consent’ and ‘rape’, which, I argue, are also 
underwritten by different understandings of the same subject matter at different times.  
 
In cases of this second kind, there are two distinct phenomena that are in need 
of explanation—difference in meaning on the one hand, and sameness of subject 
matter on the other. This amounts to a complication because no single element can 
explain both. Consequently, this second kind of meaning shift cannot be adequately 
explained by an account of linguistic meaning alone. While my account of linguistic 
meaning given in section II provides an explanation of the first phenomenon of 
difference in meaning, I argue that an account of concepts is required to provide an 
explanation of the second phenomenon of sameness of subject matter. In section IV, I 
present an account of concepts that, in conjunction with the earlier account of 
linguistic meaning, accommodates cases of meaning-shift of this second kind.3  
 
The dual appeal to a theory of linguistic meaning on the one hand and a theory 
of concepts on the other is underwritten by a substantive distinction between language 
and thought. Words, I maintain, are two-sided: they have linguistic meanings, and 
they express concepts. Where there is stability of subject matter through linguistic 
change, I argue, it is concepts that explain the stability. The linguistic meaning of a 
term cannot be equated with the concept expressed by that term given that the two 
have different explanatory roles and are subject to different norms.  
 
The distinction between the linguistic meaning of a term and the concept 
expressed by that term provides an understanding of genuine disagreement, thus 
avoiding widespread linguistic and conceptual relativism, and it provides a framework 
for understanding ameliorative change in the context of what has become known as 
conceptual engineering. These implications are discussed in section V. The claims of 
the paper are general, applying to mathematical and logical terms, to theoretical terms 
in the natural, social and political sciences, to philosophical terms and to overtly 
normative terms such as ethical terms. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to work 
                                            
3 One might say, as Rob Stainton suggested in discussion, that cases of both kinds involve the 
preservation of a phonological item, but only cases of the second kind involve the preservation of a 
lexical item. The distinction between the categories is inevitably vague given the distinction, which I 
articulate below, between subject matter and extension. Nonetheless, there are determinate cases in 
each category, and hence a fundamental difference between them. 
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through examples in each of these areas in the present paper. For some, I have done 
so elsewhere (e.g. Sawyer 2014); for others, I hope to do so in the future. The aim of 
the present paper is to provide an outline of the general framework in play. 
 
II 
 
Meaning Shift: Type 1 Cases. I begin with a closer look at meaning shift of the first 
kind—meaning shift that is accompanied by a corresponding change in subject 
matter. Consider once again the term ‘meat’. Let us assume that at some earlier point 
in time, t1, the term ‘meat’ meant food in general and that at the current point in time, 
t2, the term means animal flesh that is eaten as food. Under this assumption, the 
meaning of the term ‘meat’ has clearly changed between then and now. Equally 
clearly, the extension of the term has changed.4 There are some things, such as apples, 
bread and cake, which fall into the extension of the term at t1 but do not fall into its 
extension at t2; apples, bread and cake are food in general, but are not animal flesh 
that is eaten as food. This also marks a change in subject matter. An explanation is 
needed, then, of the change in meaning, extension and subject matter. It is provided 
by an account of linguistic meaning together with an account of the relation between 
meaning and extension, as follows. 
 
I take meaning to be determined by use, where the use in question is located at 
the level of the linguistic community viewed as a whole rather than at the level of the 
individual speaker. Linguistic meaning in this sense is what dictionaries aim to 
record. I do not deny that there are individual aspects to meaning, but the 
phenomenon of meaning shift is best understood as a shift in conventional linguistic 
meaning in the communal sense, and it is, accordingly, conventional linguistic 
meaning that is the focus of the paper.  
 
The way in which use determines linguistic meaning is complex. The 
linguistic meaning of a term cannot be understood as a simple aggregate of individual 
uses. Given what is often widespread diversity in use, a conjunction of individual uses 
                                            
4 Meaning shift does not necessitate a change in extension. However, many cases of meaning shift do 
involve a change in extension, and I will focus exclusively on these in the paper.  
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would tend towards an inconsistent meaning satisfied by nothing, and a disjunction of 
individual uses would eliminate the possibility of substantive error and undermine the 
normativity of language. Nor can the linguistic meaning of a term be understood in 
purely statistical terms, since a linguistic norm cannot be understood as a statistical 
norm given the merely descriptive nature of the latter. Each of these approaches 
ignores the fact that language is essentially a cooperative, social phenomenon and that 
linguistic meaning is shaped by patterns of deference amongst members of a linguistic 
community some of whom are more competent in the use of terms than others. 
 
I suggest that the linguistic meaning of a term at a time be understood as the 
characterization of the relevant subject matter that members of the linguistic 
community would settle on at that time were they to reach reflective equilibrium in 
the context of a dialectic. For an account of linguistic meaning along these lines see 
Burge (1986) and (1989). See also Sawyer (2007). The account accommodates the 
obvious truth that some members of a linguistic community will be more competent 
in the use of a term than others, since in the context of a dialectic, those who are less 
competent would naturally defer to those who are more competent.5 The account of 
linguistic meaning also accommodates the truth in Quine’s claim (Quine 1951) that 
there is no separating truths of meaning from matters of fact, since the 
characterization of a subject matter could not be agreed without reflection on how the 
relevant term is applied in actual cases. The agreed characterization would reflect the 
actual practice of the linguistic community at the time, not by accommodating each 
individual’s actual use, but by accommodating the actual use of the most competent 
and the deferential patterns amongst all. This is the sense in which linguistic meaning 
is determined by use. The agreed characterization would also set the relevant 
linguistic norms by establishing how the relevant term ought to be used. On this 
understanding, a term is used correctly if and only if it is used in accordance with the 
characterization of the subject matter that would be settled on in the context of a 
dialectic at the time.6 
                                            
5 See Putnam (1973) for a seminal discussion of the contribution of deference to linguistic meaning, 
although, for reasons given below, I disagree with the particular account of deference he provides. See 
also Burge (1982). 
6 Note that my claims about the normativity of language can be reconciled with the arguments against 
the normativity of language in Hattiangadi (2007), but space precludes discussion of the matter. I take 
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The notion of a dialectic here is an idealisation, but one that is intended to 
capture truths about the way a word is actually used at a given moment in time. This 
means that it must be understood as involving restrictions of at least two sorts. First, 
for terms which have an empirical element, such as ‘whale’, ‘atom’ and ‘sofa’, the 
admissible information must be restricted to include only empirical information which 
is accepted by the most competent speakers at the time. Second, for terms which have 
an apriori element, such as ‘number’, ‘validity’ and ‘knowledge’, the admissible level 
of reflection must be restricted to include only reflection available from within the 
confines of theories held by the most competent speakers at the time. In practice, 
terms will typically involve both elements. The reasons for the restrictions should be 
clear, since a violation of either restriction could lead to a settled characterization that 
not only outstrips current usage, but also tends towards an idealised characterization 
of a subject matter, thereby undermining the distinction between actual linguistic 
meaning and ideal linguistic meaning. The relevant notion, then, is not of maximal 
dialectical reflection on the subject matter, but of full reflection within actual 
empirical and theoretical boundaries. 
 
This understanding of linguistic meaning provides an adequate explanation of 
the difference in meaning between the term ‘meat’ at t1 and the term ‘meat’ at t2. The 
meaning of the term ‘meat’ at t1 is given by the characterization of the relevant 
subject matter that would have been settled on by members of the linguistic 
community at t1; the meaning of the term ‘meat’ at t2 is given by the characterization 
of the relevant subject matter that would be settled on by members of the current 
linguistic community, at t2. These would clearly differ: the characterization of the 
subject matter associated with the term ‘meat’ at t1 would plausibly be food in 
general, while the characterization of the subject matter associated with the term 
‘meat’ at t2 would plausibly be animal flesh that is eaten as food. The linguistic 
meaning of the term ‘meat’ at t1 differs from the linguistic meaning of the term at t2 
because the underlying linguistic practices at those times differ.  
 
                                            
thought, rather than language, to be the locus of fundamental, irreducible norms. A similar position is 
defended by Burge (1986). 
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The understanding of linguistic meaning I have suggested provides an 
adequate explanation of difference in meaning generally. Where there is change in 
linguistic practice, there will be change in linguistic meaning; and where there is 
change in linguistic meaning, this will be because there is change in linguistic 
practice. The meanings of terms such as ‘meat’, ‘clue’ and ‘spinster’, all of which 
display meaning shift of the first kind, have changed over time because the use of 
these terms in the linguistic community has changed over time. That is, the 
characterizations of the relevant subject matter that would be settled on by the 
relevant linguistic communities in the context of a dialectic would differ at the 
different times. The next task is to explain the change in extension of such terms over 
time. 
 
The extension of a general, non-indexical term, such as ‘meat’, is typically 
understood as its range of applicability, where this in turn is understood as the class of 
entities to which the term correctly applies. However, given the distinction I draw 
later between the linguistic meaning of a term and the concept it expresses, this 
formulation is unacceptably ambiguous. Does the term correctly apply in virtue of its 
linguistic meaning, or in virtue of the concept it expresses? To avoid this ambiguity, I 
will say that the extension of a general, non-indexical term is the class of entities that 
satisfy the term’s linguistic meaning. The relation of satisfaction here is appropriate 
because the meaning of a general term is descriptive. Thus it is because an apple 
satisfies the description ‘food in general’ that it falls into the extension of the term 
‘meat’ at t1; and it is because an apple does not satisfy the description ‘animal flesh 
that is eaten as food’ that it does not fall into the extension of the term ‘meat’ at t2. 
The extension of a general term is specifically the extension of its linguistic meaning. 
For such terms, we can say that meaning determines extension.7  
 
The account of the relation between meaning and extension I have suggested 
provides a general explanation of the change in extension that accompanies meaning 
                                            
7 I take the extension of a general term at time t to include all and only those entities that satisfy, at any 
point in time, the term’s meaning at t. For example, the extension of the term ‘meat’ at t1 includes all 
the apples, bread, cake and so on that have existed, do exist or will exist—not just those that exist at t1. 
This means that, for such terms, the extension does not change over time unless the meaning of the 
term shifts. I leave to one side the question of whether it is determinate at a given time what will exist 
at a later time, and hence leave to one side related issues concerning determinacy of extension. 
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shift of the first kind. The extensions of terms such as ‘meat’, ‘clue’ and ‘spinster’ 
change over time because different entities satisfy their descriptive meanings at 
different times. Meaning shift of this first kind is also accompanied by a change in 
subject matter. What makes meaning shift of this first kind relatively straightforward 
is the fact that the intuitive change in subject matter of the relevant terms is marked, 
in each case, by the change in extension that results from the change in linguistic 
meaning. As such, the account of linguistic meaning and the relation between 
meaning and extension provides an adequate account of meaning shift of this first 
kind.8 
 
III 
 
Meaning Shift: Type 2 Cases. Let us now take a closer look at meaning shift of the 
second kind—meaning shift that is not accompanied by a corresponding change in 
subject matter. Consider once again the term ‘whale’. Let us assume that at some 
earlier point in time, t1, the term ‘whale’ meant a very large fish with a streamlined 
hairless body, a horizontal tail fin, and a blowhole on top of the head for breathing 
and that at the current point in time, t2, the term means a very large marine mammal 
with a streamlined hairless body, a horizontal tail fin, and a blowhole on top of the 
head for breathing. Under this assumption, the term ‘whale’ has a different linguistic 
meaning at t1 from the linguistic meaning it has at t2.  The term ‘whale’ exhibits the 
phenomenon of meaning shift.  
 
This fits naturally with the account of linguistic meaning given in the previous 
section. The characterizations of the relevant subject matter—whales—that would be 
settled on by the relevant linguistic communities in the context of a dialectic would 
differ at the different times. The account of linguistic meaning provided, then, 
explains the difference in meaning between the term ‘whale’ at t1 and the term 
‘whale’ at t2.  
 
                                            
8 Although the linguistic meaning of a term is specified descriptively, there will be an ineliminable 
demonstrative element to linguistic meaning because of the role that examples play in use and in the 
context of the dialectic. 
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But what explains the stability of the subject matter? It is natural to think that 
the subject matter of a term is, just like the extension of a term, determined by its 
linguistic meaning—that the subject matter of a term and the extension of that term go 
hand in hand (perhaps, even, that they are identical). These natural thoughts are 
consistent with cases that exhibit the first kind of meaning shift. But they are 
inconsistent with cases that exhibit the second kind of meaning shift. In such cases, 
the extension of a term changes along with a change in linguistic meaning despite the 
fact that the subject matter remains the same. That the extension changes can be seen 
by reflecting on the way in which linguistic meaning determines reference. 
 
The extension of a general, non-indexical term, recall, is the class of entities 
that satisfy the term’s linguistic meaning. The extension of the term ‘whale’ at t1, 
then, is the class of entities that satisfy the description ‘a very large fish with a 
streamlined hairless body, a horizontal tail fin, and a blowhole on top of the head for 
breathing’; and the extension of the term at t2 is the class of entities that satisfy the 
description ‘a very large marine mammal with a streamlined hairless body, a 
horizontal tail fin, and a blowhole on top of the head for breathing’. On the 
assumption that the descriptions are not satisfied by the same class of entities—on the 
assumption, that is, that no fish is a mammal—it follows that the extension of the term 
‘whale’ has changed.9 
 
The extension of a term is determined by its descriptive linguistic meaning. 
Since a change in both the meaning and the extension of a term is consistent with no 
change in subject matter, we must conclude first, that the linguistic meaning of a term 
does not determine its subject matter, and second, that the subject matter of a term 
cannot be specified by a specification of the entities that fall into its extension, since 
the two may diverge. 10 We are in need, then, of an explanatory account of what 
                                            
9 The assumption may seem obvious, but see Dupré (1999) for an argument to the contrary. For this 
reason, the example may be ill-chosen. I have stuck with the example nonetheless because of its 
simplicity. My general framework is unaffected.  
10 The extent to which the extension of a term and the associated subject matter may diverge is 
considerable. In extreme cases—indeed, plausibly in the case of ‘whale’ as used at t1—the extension of 
a term may be empty. This will no doubt seem counterintuitive. However, its counterintuitive 
appearance can be traced to a conflation between the linguistic meaning of a term and the concept 
expressed by that term—more specifically, a conflation between the extension of the linguistic 
meaning of a term and the extension of the referent of the concept expressed by the term. This is 
discussed in more detail below. 
10 
 
determines the intuitive notion of a subject matter given that it cannot be linguistic 
meaning. I will argue that the subject matter of a term is determined by the concept 
the term expresses.  
 
To underscore the claim that linguistic meaning does not determine subject 
matter, note that identity of linguistic meaning is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
identity of subject matter. The failure of necessity is demonstrated by the example 
above of the term ‘whale’; the meaning of the term ‘whale’ at t1 is different from the 
meaning of the term ‘whale’ at t2, and yet their subject matter—whales—is identical. 
The failure of sufficiency can be demonstrated by a counterfactual variant of the case. 
We need only imagine a counterfactual scenario in which the meaning of the term 
‘whale’ at t1 remains fixed, because the practices of the linguistic community at t1 
remain fixed, but the world is different in the following respect. In the counterfactual 
scenario the very large creatures with streamlined hairless bodies, horizontal tail fins, 
and blowholes on top of their heads for breathing are fish rather than mammals. The 
meaning of the term ‘whale’ at t1 is hypothesized to be the same in the counterfactual 
scenario as in the actual world, and yet the subject matter is clearly different; in the 
counterfactual scenario the subject matter is not whales (we may even assume that 
there are none)—it is fish of a certain kind. Identity of linguistic meaning, then, is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for identity of subject matter. 
 
I have argued that the linguistic meaning of a term does not determine its 
subject matter on the grounds that identity of linguistic meaning is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for identity of subject matter. I have also claimed that it is the concept 
expressed by a term rather than its linguistic meaning that determines its subject 
matter. In the next section, I offer an account of concepts that supports the claim. 
 
IV 
 
Concepts. I take concepts to be mental representations that are components of 
thought, and I advocate an externalist understanding of mental representation 
according to which mental representation depends constitutively on non-
representational relations between a subject and her environment. Concepts, then, are 
individuated, in part, but essentially, by relations between a thinker and objective 
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properties in her world. We can say that the property F that in part individuates a 
thinker’s concept C is both the property to which C refers and the property that C 
represents.  
 
This externalist understanding of concepts is illustrated by considering, once 
again, the example of the term ‘whale’. On an externalist understanding of mental 
representation, the term ‘whale’ expresses the concept whale in the actual world both 
at t1 and at t2 in virtue of the fact that the linguistic community at t1 and the linguistic 
community at t2 both stand in the requisite relation to whales. In the counterfactual 
scenario, in contrast, the term ‘whale’ does not express the concept whale since, in the 
counterfactual scenario, the creatures that look and behave like whales are not whales 
but are instead a type of fish. We can call these creatures ‘whale-fish’. In the 
counterfactual scenario, then, according to the externalist, the term ‘whale’ expresses 
the distinct concept whale-fish, since members of the linguistic community stand in 
the relevant relation not to whales but to whale-fish.  
 
Note that the concept expressed by the term ‘whale’ in the actual world 
remains constant through the change in its linguistic meaning and hence through the 
change in its extension. As such, members of the linguistic community at t1 and 
members of the linguistic community at t2 are able to think and talk about whales 
despite the difference in linguistic meaning and extension of the term ‘whale’ at the 
different times. It is thought—specifically concepts—that provides stability through 
linguistic change. The externalist understanding of concepts, then, explains the fact 
that the subject matter of the term ‘whale’ is the same at t1 as at t2. It is the concept 
expressed by a term that determines its subject matter. This is, in effect, a 
consequence of the fact that the subject matter itself enters into the individuation 
conditions of the relevant concept. 
 
This marks a significant difference between language and thought that is often 
overlooked in the literature on externalism, although the distinction is clearly 
articulated by Burge (1986). In the linguistic case, we have a distinction between an 
individual’s use of a term and the use of that term by the community taken as a whole. 
That is, we have a distinction between the characterization of a subject matter that an 
individual would provide, and the characterization of that subject matter that the 
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members of her linguistic community would settle on in the context of a dialectic. It is 
the latter that determines linguistic meaning. This explains how a term can have a 
single linguistic meaning at a time and yet nonetheless be used differently by different 
individuals at that time. The linguistic meaning of a term can be stable across 
different individual uses within a linguistic community because the linguistic meaning 
of a term is a function of how the community uses the term rather than a function of 
how the individual uses the term. 
 
In the conceptual case, we have a corresponding distinction between an 
individual’s conception, and the conception of the community viewed as a whole. 
That is, we have a distinction between the set of beliefs that an individual associates 
with a concept and the set of beliefs that the members of a community would agree 
were associated with the concept in the context of a dialectic. But in the conceptual 
case, neither the former nor the latter determine the concept expressed by a term. 
According to the externalist, concepts are not individuated by individual 
conceptions—they are not individuated by the way the individual thinker takes the 
world to be. Nor, according to the externalist, are concepts individuated by communal 
conceptions—they are not individuated by the way the community as a whole takes 
the world to be. Concepts are individuated by relations to objective properties 
independently of our individual or communal conceptions of them. Consequently, not 
only can a term express a single concept while being associated with different 
individual conceptions by different individuals, but, crucially, a term can express a 
single concept while being associated with different communal conceptions by 
different linguistic communities. This is what allows concepts, and not linguistic 
meaning, to determine a subject matter that remains stable through linguistic change. 
Linguistic meaning is a function of use, which is a function of communal 
conceptions; concepts, in contrast, stand over and above even communal conceptions. 
My account of concepts is closely aligned to a particular understanding of Frege’s 
notion of sense (‘sinn’), where this is understood as a cognitive notion and not a 
linguistic notion. See for example Frege (1892) & (1918). For convincing arguments 
against the (commonplace) identification of Fregean sense and linguistic meaning, see 
Burge (1979b), (1991) and (2012).  In my framework, the linguistic meaning of a 
term determines its extension while the concept expressed by a term determines its 
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referent. There is an element of truth, then, in Frege’s claim that sense determines 
reference. But reference is best understood as a cognitive relation, not a linguistic one. 
 
My account of the linguistic meaning of a term as a community’s best attempt 
to characterise the relevant subject matter invites an interpretation of Putnam’s 
original Twin Earth thought experiment that differs from the standard externalist 
interpretation. See Putnam (1973). See also Kripke (1972), which invites the same 
reinterpretation. The set-up is familiar. Whereas the watery liquid on Earth is water 
(H2O), the watery liquid on Twin Earth is hypothesized to be twin water (XYZ). For 
simplicity, let us assume that the molecular structure of water was not known to 
anyone in 1700 on Earth, but was known generally in 2000, and that the molecular 
structure of twin water was not known to anyone in 1700 on Twin Earth, but was 
known generally in 2000. According to Putnam, the difference between Earth and 
Twin Earth implies: first, that the term ‘water’ on Earth differs in meaning and 
extension from the term ‘water’ on Twin Earth, both in 1700 and in 2000; and, 
second, that neither term undergoes a change in meaning or a corresponding change 
in extension through this period. The account of linguistic meaning I have provided 
entails the rejection of both of these claims. 
 
Given that the difference between water and twin water is evident only at the 
level of molecular structure, and that in 1700 no-one knew about molecular structure, 
the best attempts of the linguistic community on Earth to characterize water in 1700 
would have been identical to the best attempts of the linguistic community on Twin 
Earth to characterize twin water at that time. The linguistic meaning of the term 
‘water’ on both Earth and Twin Earth would have been something like clear, 
colourless, potable liquid that fills the river and lakes and sustains life. Since the 
extension of a term is the class of entities that satisfy its descriptive meaning, the 
extension of the term ‘water’ would also have been the same on Earth as on Twin 
Earth in 1700. I assume for the sake of simplicity here that extensions are classes of 
entities across possible worlds. 
 
By the time we reach 2000 the term ‘water’ on Earth does indeed differ in 
meaning and extension from the term ‘water’ on Twin Earth. I agree with Putnam on 
this point, albeit for different reasons. In 2000, the term ‘water’ on Earth differs in 
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linguistic meaning from the term ‘water’ on Twin Earth because each of the relevant 
communities had sufficient knowledge of the molecular structure of water and twin 
water respectively that their linguistic practices differ. The characterization of water 
that the linguistic community on Earth would settle on in the context of a dialectic 
includes a description of its molecular structure, H2O; and the characterization of 
twin water that the linguistic community on Twin Earth would settle on in the context 
of a dialectic includes a description of its molecular structure, XYZ. It is because the 
linguistic practices on Earth differ from those on Twin Earth that the term ‘water’ on 
Earth differs in linguistic meaning from the term ‘water’ on Twin Earth. And it is 
because the different linguistic meanings are satisfied by different liquids that the 
terms also differ in extension. What we have, then, is a change in linguistic meaning 
and a corresponding change in extension from 1700 to 2000 both on Earth and on 
Twin Earth. Putnam’s claim that there is no meaning shift and no change in extension 
should be rejected.  
 
Putnam’s mistake was to think that the intuitions relating to Twin Earth were 
intuitions concerning the nature of language. They are, in part, intuitions about the 
nature of thought. It is not just that what Putnam says about language can also be said 
about thought. This, of course, is one of Burge’s contributions to the externalist 
theory of thought that my account of concepts depends on. See Burge (1979a). It is, 
rather, that Putnam argues for claims about the nature of language on the basis of 
intuitions that are best understood as intuitions about the nature of thought. We can 
see this by noting a tension in Putnam’s account. Putnam distinguishes two elements 
that he claims are missing from traditional semantic theory. The first is ‘the 
contribution of society’; the second is ‘the contribution of the real world’ (Putnam 
1973, p. 711). But the two elements pull in different directions.  
 
The contribution of society to linguistic meaning implies that the meaning of 
the term ‘water’ as used on Earth at t1 is identical to the meaning of the term ‘water’ 
as used on Twin Earth at t1. As we saw above, this follows from my account of 
linguistic meaning which emphasises the role of society in the determination of 
meaning. But the implication does not depend on my account. Putnam himself 
introduces the notion of linguistic deference, which he articulates as deference to 
‘experts’. In this context, experts have typically been understood as those who are 
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knowledgeable about the subject matter. But the experts to whom we defer at a given 
moment in time are actual experts rather than ideal, all-knowing experts. They are not 
infallible and cannot be presumed to know everything there is to know about the 
relevant subject matter. The history of science is replete with experts who were wrong 
about at least some aspects of the subject matter that fell into their area of expertise. 
Experts, then, insofar as they are actual members of a linguistic community to whom 
people might defer, are merely those who are the most competent amongst us in the 
use of a term. If the linguistic meaning of an individual’s term is determined by what 
the experts mean by that term, then linguistic meaning is determined by the experts’ 
best attempt to characterize the subject matter. 
 
The contribution of the real world to linguistic meaning, however, implies, as 
Putnam maintains, that the meaning of the term ‘water’ as used on Earth at t1 is 
different from the meaning of the term ‘water’ as used on Twin Earth at t1. Water and 
twin water are objectively different, independently of what anyone, even an expert, 
believes, and this apparently supports the intuition of difference in linguistic meaning. 
If the two contributions that Putnam identifies are understood as contributions to a 
single phenomenon—whether that be linguistic meaning, as Putnam supposed, or 
thought—they will generate inconsistencies. Since the experts in society are 
themselves prone to error in their characterizations of the real world, the contribution 
of society and the contribution of the real world will sometimes deliver inconsistent 
results about the nature of the single phenomenon in question; society will pull 
towards change while the real world pulls towards stability.  
 
To resolve the problem, the two contributions need to be seen as contributions 
to different phenomena. The contribution of society that Putnam identifies is best 
understood as a contribution to language, and the contribution of the real world that 
he identifies is best understood as a contribution to thought. This is what I have been 
suggesting throughout the paper. The linguistic practices of society constrain 
linguistic meaning, which determines extension. The real world constrains concepts, 
which determine reference. On this understanding, we can make sense of Putnam’s 
(incorrect) claim that the term ‘water’ on Earth does not change its meaning over time 
by reconstruing it as the claim that the concept expressed by the term does not change 
over time. We can then do justice to both of Putnam’s claims: although the term 
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‘water’ has the same linguistic meaning in 1700 on Earth as it does on Twin Earth, the 
subject matter differs; moreover, although the term ‘water’ on Earth in 2000 differs in 
both linguistic meaning and extension from the term ‘water’ on Earth in 1700, the 
subject matter remains the same. The term ‘water’ exhibits meaning shift of the 
second kind. 
 
Linguistic meaning is determined by patterns of actual use; concepts are 
determined by real relations to objective properties. As such, concepts can provide 
stability through linguistic change. This provides an adequate explanation of meaning 
shift of the second kind.  
 
V 
 
Error, Disagreement and Truth. Distinguishing clearly between linguistic meaning 
and concepts provides us with a theoretical framework in which we can make sense 
both of change and of stability. Linguistic meaning tracks the former; concepts 
explain the latter. Without an account of stability, all meaning shift is meaning shift of 
the first kind and hence all meaning shift will inevitably amount to changing the topic. 
This brings with it the kind of incommensurability that Kuhn (1962) thought plagued 
theory change, and entails an unacceptable relativism.  
 
Take the sentence ‘Bread is a form of meat’. The sentence was generally 
regarded as true at t1 but is generally regarded as false at t2. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that any appearance of disagreement is merely superficial. The sentences simply 
express different thoughts at the different times, because the concept expressed by the 
term ‘meat’ at t1 is distinct from the concept expressed by the term ‘meat’ at t2. This 
means that the sentence is true at t1 (true relative to the linguistic framework at t1) but 
false at t2 (false relative to the linguistic framework at t2). The notion of a linguistic 
framework is articulated in Carnap (1947), but see especially Carnap (1950). In cases 
of this first kind, there is no stability of subject matter because a change in linguistic 
meaning is tracked by a change in concept.  
 
Now consider the sentence ‘Whales are fish’. This sentence was also generally 
regarded as true at t1 but is generally regarded as false at t2. If a change in linguistic 
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meaning is always tracked by a change in concept, then we are forced to say that here 
too, the sentences simply express different thoughts at the different times, because the 
concept expressed by the term ‘whale’ at t1 is distinct from the concept expressed by 
the term ‘whale’ at t2, and, consequently, the sentence is true at t1 (true relative to the 
linguistic framework at t1) but false at t2 (false relative to the linguistic framework at 
t2). But once we distinguish between the linguistic meaning of a term and the concept 
expressed by a term in the way I have suggested, we can allow that the concept 
expressed by the term ‘whale’ remains constant through the linguistic change between 
t1 and t2, and hence understand the apparent disagreement as a genuine disagreement 
about whales. The distinction between language and thought brings with it a 
distinction between linguistic frameworks, individuated by actual linguistic practices, 
and conceptual frameworks, individuated by real relations to the world. This provides 
an antedote both to Kuhn’s claims about incommensurability and to Carnap’s (1947) 
eschewal of so-called ‘external’ questions.  
 
It also addresses head-on the apparent dilemma raised in Sainsbury’s (2014). 
According to Sainsbury, we are faced with a dilemma. Either the sentence ‘Whales 
are fish’ means the same in ancient times as now, or it doesn’t. To say that it does, 
according to Sainsbury, belies the fact that meaning is determined by use; but to say 
that it doesn’t belies the fact that there is substantive disagreement across the two 
times. Sainsbury concludes, ‘There is something paradoxical about fish.’ And 
conjectures that ‘[a]n adequate resolution will require carefully formulated 
metasemantic principles.’ (Sainsbury 2014, p. 5). The alternative I have proposed 
resolves the apparent dilemma. Once we distinguish the linguistic from the 
conceptual, we can assert both that the meaning of the sentence differs at the two 
times, which accommodates the fact that the use of the term differs at the two times; 
and that the sentence expresses the same thought at the two times, which 
accommodates the fact that there is substantive disagreement. 
 
Reflection on the change in linguistic meaning of the term ‘whale’ over time 
also brings to light a point about the rationale for theoretical and linguistic change. I 
have said that the linguistic meaning of a term can be thought of as a community’s 
best attempt to characterise the relevant subject matter. We have seen that there is a 
potential gap between a community’s best attempt to characterize the relevant subject 
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matter and the correct characterization of that subject matter. And it is recognition of 
this gap in particular cases that drives theory change and hence change in linguistic 
meaning. The gap is identified in Burge (1986), where the difference between 
language and thought is also articulated. In the actual world, the linguistic 
community’s best attempt to characterise whales at t1 turned out to be incorrect. 
Nonetheless, it provided the linguistic meaning of the term ‘whale’ at that time. The 
shift in meaning of the term ‘whale’ between t1 and t2 can, then, be understood as a 
change in linguistic practice brought about by a realization that the initial 
characterization was incorrect. In the context of a dialectic at some point between t1 
and t2, the initial characterization would have been rejected and replaced by one that 
was considered to be accurate. The characterization may, of course, still have fallen 
short, but this allows for further change in meaning as the community’s knowledge 
evolves. 
 
 Our characterizations of various subject matters often fall short of the facts. 
And a change in linguistic practice can often be understood as an attempt to 
characterize the facts more accurately than has previously been achieved. These 
attempts rationalise meaning shift of the second kind. As such, wherever there is the 
possibility of less than full understanding of a given subject matter, there is the 
possibility of this second kind of meaning shift. Examples abound not just in 
empirical science, but in philosophy, mathematics, and logic, as well as in the social, 
political and moral realm. As I said at the outset, I do not have the space to discuss 
detailed examples in each case. For now, I offer some brief remarks on an example 
drawn from the recent literature on ameliorative change and conceptual engineering. 
The literature is vast, and growing, but see for example Appiah (1992), Haslanger 
(2012), Ecklund (2014) and Cappelen (2018). 
 
I take as my example the term ‘rape’. The debate about whether rape should 
be recognised as a phenomenon that could occur within marriage as well as outside of 
marriage goes back a long way. But the debate, I suggest, is correctly understood as a 
debate about rape. This can only be true if there is some stability of subject matter 
across the two sides of that debate. Linguistic practice surrounding the term ‘rape’ has 
clearly changed over time. This means that the linguistic meaning of the term ‘rape’ 
has changed over time. But we should not, I suggest, accept the kind of relativism 
19 
 
about rape that would follow from thinking of the change in meaning as meaning shift 
of the first kind. Acts of rape within marriage may not previously have been 
recognised as such, but they were acts of rape nonetheless. The change in linguistic 
practice reflects a recognition that the earlier linguistic practice got the facts wrong. It 
reflected a misunderstanding of the nature of rape. Naturally, there is more to be said 
both about the specific example and, more generally, about when to classify an 
apparent change in linguistic practice as exemplifying a change in linguistic meaning 
of the second kind as opposed to a shift in focus to a different, perhaps related aspect 
of the world that comes to seem more pressing. I will return to these issues on a future 
occasion. 
 
For now, I finish with a potential objection to the overall framework. It might 
be thought that it is my account of linguistic meaning that should be rejected. Perhaps 
instead, we should understand linguistic meaning not as tied to actual practice, but as 
determined by real relations to objective properties in the way that I have understood 
concepts to be determined. On the proposed alternative view, the linguistic meaning 
of a term would determine its subject matter as well as its extension. Thus the subject 
matter and extension of the term ‘rape’ in the past would be identical to the subject 
matter and extension of the term now. However, this has the benefit of 
accommodating stability at the cost of eliminating meaning shift of the second kind. 
On this view, the meaning of the term ‘rape’ would be the same across time, and 
hence there would be no meaning shift. Moreover, it eliminates a theoretical notion of 
linguistic meaning that tracks the actual use of a term by a linguistic community. 
There are two important aspects to our language-use that need to be explained: actual 
linguistic usage and, as we might put it, ideal linguistic usage—how certain of our 
terms are in fact used and how those terms ought to be used. On this proposed 
alternative view of linguistic meaning, we fail to capture the first; but without a theory 
of concepts, we fail to capture the second. This distinction is discussed in Burge 
(2012, p. 589). Perhaps particularly in the context of moral terms, we should be 
aiming to use our terms in the way in which they ought to be used, not just in the 
sense of according with the community’s best attempt to characterize the subject 
matter, but in the sense of according with the correct characterization of the subject 
matter. I take ‘rape’, for example, to be a moral term because it is essentially a term 
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for an act that ought, morally, not to occur. Concepts provide us with the stability of 
subject matter that makes the move from the one to the other possible. 
 
VI 
 
Conclusion. I have argued that the linguistic meaning of a term is not to be equated 
with the concept expressed by that term because the two have different explanatory 
roles and are subject to different norms. Where there is stability of subject matter 
through linguistic change, it is concepts that explain the stability. It is also concepts 
that explain the possibility of genuine disagreement over a single subject matter, thus 
avoiding widespread linguistic and conceptual relativism. Concepts provide us with a 
fundamental representational relation to aspects of reality even when we do not fully 
comprehend them. Our lack of comprehension is evident in almost every area of 
inquiry: philosophy, mathematics, logic, empirical science, the social, the political 
and the moral. But in all these areas, we can strive for understanding and for meaning 
shift in the right direction. We can strive, that is, towards the true and the good.11 
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